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Information Feedback in  
Iterative Combinatorial Auctions 
Alexander Pikovsky, Martin Bichler 
Technische Universität München, Germany 
Abstract: Auctions have been getting increasing attention in computer science and 
economics, as they provide an efficient solution to resource allocation problems 
with self-interested agents. E-Commerce and finance have emerged as some of 
their largest application fields. The need for new auction mechanisms that allow 
complex bids such as bundle or multi-attribute bids has been raised in many situa-
tions. Beyond strategic problems, the design of these advanced auction formats 
exhibits hard computational problems. Pricing is one of the major challenges in 
designing iterative combinatorial auctions. The presence of bundle bids implies 
the existence of cases with no linear prices that support competitive equilibrium. 
This paper introduces a framework of pricing concepts and discusses recent im-
plementations. 
Keywords: Combinatorial auction, multidimensional auction, pricing, primal-dual 
algorithm 
1 Introduction 
Auctions have been found to be efficient economic mechanisms for resource allo-
cation in distributed environments with self-interested agents [Klem99]. They 
have found numerous applications in finance and e-commerce, and provide a 
promising technique for coordination in many computational environments such 
as agent-based systems. The typical auction consists of the bid submission, bid 
evaluation (a.k.a. winner determination, market clearing, or resource allocation), 
and the calculation of settlement prices, followed by some feedback to the bidders 
in an iterative, or open-cry auction (see Figure 1). Auctions close either at a fixed 
point in time or according to a certain stopping rule (e.g. no new bids were sub-
mitted). The competitive process of auctions serves to aggregate the scattered in-
formation about bidders' valuations and to dynamically set prices of a trade. 
A fundamental shortcoming of traditional auction mechanisms is their inability to 
allow for complex bid structures which exploit complementarities and economies 
of scale in cost structures of bidders. As many organizations have begun to realize 
the efficacy of auctions, interest has emerged to extend basic auction types to sup-
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port negotiations beyond price, and communicate bids with a more complex set of 
preferences. For example, procurement of direct inputs is usually very large and 
requires the use of special price negotiation schemes that incorporate appropriate 
business practices. 
start
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a period of time
evaluate bids and
compute the provisional allocation
stopping rule satisfied?
no
stop
provide information
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Figure 1: Process of an Iterative Auction 
Typically, bids in these settings have the following properties: 
• large transaction volume, volume discounts provided by suppliers 
• all-or-nothing bids on a set of items with a special discounted price 
• multiple, non-price attributes of a good can be traded off against the price 
Volume discount auctions facilitate negotiations on large quantities of goods 
[DaKa00], combinatorial auctions allow bids on packages [RP98, Nis00], whereas 
multiattribute auctions facilitate negotiation on multiple attributes [Bich01]. These 
”multidimensional” auctions have performed well in the lab, but also in a number 
of real-world implementations (see [Cra+04] for combinatorial auctions). 
 Suppliers 
Items S1 S2 S3 S4 
10 HD A 10GB 1 0 1 1 
20 HD B 40GB 0 1 1 1 
20 HD C 60GB 1 1 1 0 
Bid Price €4000 €5800 €6700 €3500 
Table 1: Combinatorial Bid Example 
Table 1 illustrates an example with a combinatorial reverse auction for computer 
hard drives with 4 suppliers. Each supplier provides a bundled ”all-or-nothing” 
bid. Notice that as the number of items increases the number of bids can grow ex-
ponentially. After collecting bids, the buyer needs to identify the set of bids that 
minimizes total procurement cost subject to business rules such as limits on the 
number of winning bidders, or the amounts purchased from certain bidders or 
groups of bidders. Identifying such bid set is a hard optimization problem. There-
fore, winner determination problem is central to most multidimensional auctions. 
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Due to several reasons (see section 2.3) iterative auction formats have emerged as 
the predominant form of combinatorial auctions (CA) in practice. However, de-
signing iterative combinatorial auctions (ICA) has turned out to be a challenging 
task. One of the main problems in ICA is the calculation of feedback prices. De-
termining appropriate prices for bundle bids is important for market designers who 
are interested in market efficiency, and for bidders who need information on how 
to improve their bids in order to become a winner. 
In this paper we outline a framework of different pricing concepts and auction 
formats for ICA and discuss recent implementation approaches. In section 2 we 
give an overview of some combinatorial auction design issues and formulate the 
winner determination problem. In section 3 we introduce different pricing 
schemes used in ICA, discuss their impact on the auction efficiency and describe 
the general model of primal-dual auctions. In section 4 we provide a classification 
of the ICA, give an overview of several selected implementations and discuss 
them with respect to the concepts defined in the previous sections. Section 5 con-
cludes with some summarizing remarks. 
2 Combinatorial Auctions 
Combinatorial auctions (CA) can be described as decentralized resource allocation 
mechanisms for environments where multiple bidders have super- or subadditive 
utility functions. The task of the auction mechanism is to allocate these resources 
in an ”optimal” way. 
2.1 Auction Design Goals 
One goal in economic theory is the allocative efficiency, in which the auction 
mechanism maximizes the total payoff across all agents. Another goal is the reve-
nue maximization, in which the auction maximizes the payoff to a particular par-
ticipant, usually the auctioneer. The utility of the bidders for the various bundles 
of resources is private information and not known to the auctioneer. Auction de-
sign can be described as a set of rules, which motivate the bidders to reveal their 
true valuations to the extent that makes it possible to solve for the optimal alloca-
tion. Overall, the auction rules can be categorized as follows: 
• the auction protocol, i.e. the sequence, syntax and semantics of messages ex-
changed throughout the auction.  
• the allocation rules, which include the overall objective of the allocation (i.e. 
efficiency vs. payoff maximization), as well as additional allocation con-
straints.  
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• the payment rules, which determine the payment from or to the winner(s). 
As in traditional auction design, the allocation rules, the auction protocol and the 
payment rules impact the bidders’ strategies. Auction designers try to construct 
incentive-compatible auctions: auctions in which bidders report truthful informa-
tion about their preferences, and they do so out of their own self-interest. Strategy 
proof mechanisms are even stronger in that truthful bidding has to be a dominant 
strategy. The second-price sealed-bid (Vickrey) auctions or, more generally, Vick-
rey Clarke Groves (VCG) mechanisms are an example of strategy proof mecha-
nisms. Bidding strategies and desirable economic properties of auctions have been 
analyzed extensively in the context of mechanism design theory [Mas+95]. 
Computational complexity has not been a major concern in traditional mechanism 
design [One+04]. Indivisibilities (also called non-convexities) as they occur in 
multidimensional auctions (due to bundle bids or economies of scale) typically 
lead to computationally hard problems. For example, the winner determination 
problem in combinatorial auctions belongs to the class of NP-hard problems (see 
section 2.2). Much of the early literature on combinatorial auctions has focused on 
this very aspect. However, also calculating feedback prices becomes a computa-
tionally difficult task (see section 3.2). 
2.2 The Winner Determination Problem 
The winner determination problem (WD, a.k.a. Combinatorial Auction Problem, 
CAP) can be modeled as an instance of the weighted set packing problem which is 
known to be NP-complete, and has a straight-forward IP formulation. 
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The objective function maximizes overall revenue with S being the item bundles, 
vi(S) being the valuation or price bid for bundle S by the bidder i, and xi(S) being a 
binary decision variable. The first set of constraints guarantees that any bidder can 
win at most one bundle1. The second set of constraints ensures that no item is sold 
                                                          
1  This is called XOR-bidding. The alternative is the OR-bidding, where one bidder can 
win multiple bundles. XOR-bidding is more flexible since it avoids the exposure 
problem (see section 2.3) still allowing bids on all possible bundles. 
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more than once with G being the set of items to be sold. The reverse auction case 
can be modeled as a set covering or set partitioning problem, respectively. 
Another combinatorial auction design aspect is additional side constraints, which 
can affect the running time (see [Kal+04]). For example, in a reverse auction, buy-
ers want to make sure that the entire supply is not purchased from too few suppli-
ers, since this creates a high exposure if some of them are not able to deliver on 
their promise. Another common constraint is volume-based budget limits, which 
are often placed as an upper total volume limit of the transaction with a particular 
bidder. 
Integer programming techniques can be used to handle winner determination in 
combinatorial auctions with a ”small enough” number of items. On the other hand, 
various heuristics and approximation algorithms are likely to produce solutions 
which, in most cases, are optimal or close to optimal. However, suboptimality may 
not be adequate, if a market designer aims for economic efficiency. Rothkopf et al. 
([RoPe98]) discuss limiting biddable combinations, which can make the winner 
determination problem tractable. A survey by de Vries and Vohra ([VrVo03]) ad-
dresses the literature of the last few years on algorithmic approaches. Similar 
computational problems can be found in volume discount auctions ([DaKa00]) 
and multi-attribute auctions ([BiKa04]). 
2.3 Combinatorial Auction Formats 
Revenue comparisons among auction mechanisms and the analysis of equilibrium 
bidding strategies are at the core of economic auction theory ([MM87, Wol96]). 
Currently, there is hardly any game-theoretical analysis of combinatorial auctions 
([KR96, Lev97]). Nevertheless, classic auction theory can serve as a guideline. 
The first-price sealed-bid auction has been used as a model for some combinato-
rial auctions in practice ([ElKe02]), however they exhibit high strategic complex-
ity for the bidder. Alternatively, VCG mechanisms were proposed, that make it a 
dominant strategy for bidders to bid their true valuations. They do this by refund-
ing to the bidders the increase in overall revenue caused by their bids. With the 
bidders’ truthful valuations, the bid taker can achieve allocative efficiency. 
Unfortunately, VCG mechanisms are impractical and hardly ever used. First of all, 
bidders need to reveal their entire utility function, i.e. to submit bids for all 2n pos-
sible bundles. This leads to a high valuation complexity for the bidders, but also to 
a large input size to the WD problem. In addition, the determination of the Vickrey 
payments itself becomes a computationally hard problem. Another problem is the 
need of a trusted auctioneer. The winner in a second price auction has to doubt, 
whether the auctioneers payment request is actually the second-highest price, and 
to worry whether the auctioneer reveals their valuations to other auction partici-
pants. Cryptographic methods have been proposed to solve this problem 
([Bran03]). 
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Many researchers consider iterative auctions as an alternative. Iterative formats 
such as the English auction are very popular in electronic commerce applications. 
They allow bidders to learn about their competitors’ bids, which is an important 
aspect if bidders’ valuations are affiliated ([Milg87]). In iterative auctions, bidders 
do not have to submit bids on all possible bundles at once, but can bid only on a 
small number of bundles in each round. 
Unfortunately, designing ICA leads to a number of other difficulties. For example, 
the well-known threshold problem refers to the difficulty that multiple bidders de-
siring small bundles that constitute a large bundle may have in outbidding a single 
bid for the large bundle. The exposure problem considers the risk of winning items 
at prices above the valuations, which usually happens if a bidder with a super-
additive valuation of bundle wins only a part of this bundle. Though the exposure 
problem is usually typical only for pseudo-combinatorial auctions (see section 4), 
it can also become relevant for combinatorial auctions in case of OR-bidding. 
Avoiding or resolving ties can become a problem, because allocations can be 
composed of multiple winners. In addition, the amount of communication between 
the bidders and the auctioneer can become quite high ([NiSe02]).This is also re-
ferred to as communicative complexity. However, the most fundamental problem 
in the ICA design is determining  feedback prices in each iteration. 
3 Theory of Iterative Combinatorial Auctions 
The key challenge in the ICA design is to provide information feedback to the bid-
ders after each iteration. Pricing (assigning prices to items and/or item bundles) 
was adopted as the most intuitive mechanism of providing feedback, especially for 
ICA with auctioneer-side allocation (see Figure 3, section 4).  
In contrast to the single-item single-unit auctions, pricing is not trivial for ICA. 
The main difference is the lack of the natural single-item prices. With bundle bids 
setting independent prices for individual items is not obvious and often even im-
possible. In the following sections we introduce 3 different pricing schemes and 
discuss their impact on the auction outcome. 
3.1 Pricing Schemes 
Definition 1. A set of prices Γ⊆Ι∈ SiSpi ,),( is called: 
• linear (or additive), if ∑ ∈=∀ Sj ii jpSpSi )()(:,  
• anonymous, if )()(:,, SpSpSlk lk =∀  
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In other words, prices are linear if the price of a bundle is equal to the sum of the 
prices of its items, and anonymous if the prices of the same bundle are equal for 
every bidder. The non-anonymous prices are also called discriminatory prices. 
The following 3 pricing schemes2 can be derived using the above definitions: 
1. linear anonymous prices 
2. non-linear anonymous prices 
3. non-linear discriminatory prices 
The first pricing scheme is obviously the simplest one. Linear anonymous prices 
are easily understandable and usually considered fair by the bidders. The commu-
nication costs are also minimized, because the amount of information to be trans-
ferred is linear in the number of items. The second pricing scheme introduces the 
non-linearity property, which is often necessary to express strong super- or subad-
ditivity in the bidder valuations. Unfortunately, non-linear prices are often consid-
ered too complex and the communication costs also increase. If even non-linear 
anonymous prices are not sufficient to lead the auction to competitive equilibrium, 
the third pricing scheme can be used.3 However, discriminatory pricing introduces 
additional complexity and is often considered unfair by the bidders. 
In the following sections we introduce the notions of the prices compatible with an 
allocation and the competitive equilibrium prices. We also summarize important 
theoretical results regarding the existence of these kinds of prices and the impact 
of the pricing schemes. 
3.1.1 Compatible Prices 
Definition 2. A set of prices pi(S) is called compatible with the allocation xi(S) and 
valuations vi(S), if 
)()(0)(:, SvSpSxSi iii >⇔=∀  and )()(1)( SvSpSx iii ≤⇔=  
The interpretation is quite intuitive: the set of prices is compatible with the given 
allocation at the given valuations if and only if all winning bids are higher than or 
equal to the prices and all loosing bids are lower than the prices (assuming the 
bidders bid at their valuations). This is best visualized by the following example. 
Example 1. Compatible prices. 
There are 2 bidders and 2 items, the bidder valuations (bids) are given by the fol-
lowing table (bids belonging to the optimal allocation are marked with a star): 
                                                          
2  To our knowledge linear discriminatory prices have been hardly considered in the 
context of combinatorial auctions. 
3  Due to [BO02] non-linear discriminatory competitive equilibrium prices do always 
exist and support the efficient allocation. 
336  A. Pikovsky, M. Bichler 
 A B AB 
Bidder 1 2 3 5 
Bidder 2 1 4 7* 
Table 2: Compatible prices example 1 
Consider the optimal allocation x2(AB) = 1 with the total revenue of 7 first. We 
can easily construct non-linear compatible prices by setting for instance 
p(A) = 100, p(B) = 100, p(AB) = 7. On the contrary, constructing linear compati-
ble prices is not a trivial task. The price set p(A) = 2, p(B) = 4, p(AB) = 6 is not 
compatible, because the bidder 1 would get the item A and the bidder 2 would also 
get the item B (the compatibility conditions are violated for {1, A} and {2, B}). The 
price set p(A) = 3, p(B) = 5, p(AB) = 8 is not compatible, because the bidder 2 
would not get the bundle AB (the compatibility conditions are violated for 
{2, AB}). The compatible price set can be found for instance at p(A) = 2.5, 
p(B) = 4.5, p(AB) = 7. 
Now consider a non-optimal allocation x2(B) = 1 with the total revenue of 4, 
which does not allocate the item A at all. In this case (even linear) compatible 
prices can also be constructed by setting the price of the item A high enough, for 
example p(A) = 100, p(B) = 4, p(AB) = 104. Notice also that if an allocation as-
signs any bundle to a non-highest bidder of this bundle, no compatible prices can 
be constructed at all.  
Compatible prices explain the winners why they won and the losers, why they 
lost. In fact, informing the bidders about the allocation xi(S) is superfluous, if 
compatible prices are communicated. However, the above example shows that not 
every set of compatible prices provides the bidder with a meaningful information 
for improving her bids in the next auction iteration. Another important observation 
is the fact that linear compatible prices are harder and often even impossible (see 
Example 3 in the following subsection) to construct, when the bidder valuations 
are super- or subadditive. 
3.1.2 Competitive Equilibrium Prices 
Definition 3. A set of prices pi(S) is in competitive equilibrium (CE)4 with the al-
location xi(S) and valuations vi(S), if 
1. The prices pi(S) are compatible with the allocation xi(S) and valuations vi(S) 
2. Given the prices pi(S), there exist no allocation with larger total revenue than 
the revenue of the allocation xi(S) 
                                                          
4  This definition is due to [Par01]. Sometimes CE prices are defined only by the 
condition 1, but the existence of  CE prices do not imply the optimality of the 
allocation in this case. 
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The idea behind this concept is to define prices characterizing the optimal alloca-
tion. The prices may not be too low to violate the compatibility condition (1), but 
they may not be too high either to violate the condition 2. In general, one can 
show that the existence of CE prices implies optimality of the allocation and that 
the opposite is also true in case of non-linear discriminatory prices: 
Theorem 1. Following statements are true: 
1. If an allocation xi(S) and prices pi(S) are in competitive equilibrium for the 
given valuations vi(S), this allocation is the optimal allocation. 
2. For the optimal allocation xi(S) there always exist discriminatory non-linear 
competitive equilibrium prices pi(S). This is not always true for linear and a-
nonymous non-linear prices. 
We will outline the proof idea of this theorem in the section 3.2.2.5 
The following examples provide a better understanding of the CE prices. The Ex-
ample 2 continues the Example 1. It illustrates which price sets constructed in the 
Example 1 are CE and shows that no CE prices exist for the non-optimal alloca-
tion. The Example 3 and Example 4 demonstrate cases where no linear and even 
no anonymous non-linear CE prices exist for the optimal allocation. 
Example 2. Competitive equilibrium prices. 
For the optimal allocation x2(AB) = 1 with the total revenue of 7 in the Example 1 
we constructed two compatible price sets, so only the competitive equilibrium 
condition 2 has to be verified. At the prices p(A) = 2.5, p(B) = 4.5, p(AB) = 7 the 
most profitable possibilities are to sell the items either in a bundle for the price 
of 7 or separately for the total price of 2.5 + 4.5 = 7. In both cases this is exactly 
the revenue of the considered allocation x2(AB) = 1, so the prices are in competi-
tive equilibrium. In contrast, the prices p(A) = 100, p(B) = 100, p(AB) = 7 are not 
CE, because the allocation x1(A) = 1, x2(B) = 1 with the total revenue of 
100 + 100 = 200 would be better than the allocation x2(AB) = 1 at the current 
prices. 
For the non-optimal allocation x2(B) = 1 with the total revenue of 4 the price set 
p(A) = 100, p(B) = 4, p(AB) = 104 is not a competitive equilibrium either, be-
cause the auctioneer can get more revenue by selling the item A. Moreover, no 
CE prices exist for this allocation, since the price of the bundle AB has to be larger 
than 7 to ensure compatibility, but in this case selling the bundle AB would bring 
more revenue than the considered allocation x2(B) = 1. 
Example 3. Linear CE prices do not always exist. 
There are 3 bidders and 3 items, the bidder valuations (bids) are given by the fol-
lowing table: 
                                                          
5  For complete proof see [BO02] or [Par01]. 
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 A B C AB BC AC ABC 
Bidder 1 60 50 50 200* 100 110 250 
Bidder 2 50 60 50 110 200 100 255 
Bidder 3 50 50 75* 100 125 200 250 
Table 3: Competitive equilibrium prices example 3 
The optimal allocation is x1(AB) = 1, x3(C) = 1 with the total revenue of 275. To 
be compatible with this allocation, prices must satisfy the following inequalities: 
p(A) + p(B)  ≤  200 p(A) + p(C)  > 200 
p(C)  ≤ 75 p(B) + p(C)  > 200 
p(A) + p(B) + 2p(C)  ≤ 350 p(A) + p(B) + 2p(C) > 400 
which is a contradiction. This proves that no linear compatible prices (and so no 
linear CE prices) exist for the optimal allocation in this case. The reason is the 
strong superadditive bidder valuations of multiple item bundles. 
Example 4. Anonymous non-linear CE prices do not always exist. 
There are 2 bidders and 2 items, the bidder valuations (bids) are given by the fol-
lowing table: 
 A B AB 
Bidder 1 0 0 3* 
Bidder 2 2 2 2 
Table 4: Competitive equilibrium example 4 
The optimal allocation is x1(AB) = 1 with the total revenue of 3. To be compatible 
with this allocation, the (anonymous) item prices p(A) and p(B) both have to be 
larger then 2. This implies that the auctioneer can get the total revenue of at least 4 
by selling the items separately, which is larger then the total revenue of the con-
sidered allocation x1(AB) = 1. This proves that no anonymous CE prices exist for 
the optimal allocation in this case. 
Note that for all considered examples we can easily construct discriminatory 
nonlinear CE prices for the optimal allocation. Generally, the more bundle valua-
tions are super- or subadditive and the stronger these super- or subadditivities are, 
the harder it is to find linear or anonymous non-linear prices. 
Note also that the competitive equilibrium conditions can be directly verified by 
the auctioneer if the agents follow the myopic best-response bidding strategy6. In 
                                                          
6  The myopic best-response bidding strategy or some similar concept is often assumed 
to simplify the auction analysis. In it each bidder maximizes her utility (value - price) 
by always biding for the most profitable bundle at the current prices. For details see 
[Par01]. 
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fact, given an allocation and a price set, the auctioneer can verify the second CE 
condition without knowing bidder valuations. The first CE condition is satisfied 
(assuming myopic best-response bidding), if all current loosing bids are lower 
than the prices, all current winning bids are not lower than the prices, and no new 
bids are submitted in the next iteration. 
The equivalence of the allocation efficiency and the existence of CE prices en-
courages designing an iterative auction, which ends up with CE prices. One im-
portant systematic approach to do that is the primal-dual auction algorithms. 
3.2 Primal-Dual Auction Algorithms 
The fundamental work of Bikhchandani and Ostroy [BiOs02] demonstrates a 
strong interrelationship between the iterative auctions and the primal-dual linear 
programming algorithms. A primal-dual linear programming algorithm can be in-
terpreted as an auction where the dual variables represent item prices. The algo-
rithm maintains a feasible allocation and a price set and terminates as the efficient 
allocation and competitive equilibrium prices are found. In this section we give an 
overview of the primal-dual algorithms in integer programming and their applica-
tions to the combinatorial auction design.  
3.2.1 LP Duality and Integer Programming - A Short Overview 
The primal-dual linear programming algorithms use the weak and strong duality 
theorems, namely the fact that for any pair of feasible primal and dual solutions 
the (primal) objective function value of the primal solution is never larger than the 
(dual) objective function value of the dual solution, and that these values are equal 
if and only if both solutions are optimal for the correspondent problems. 
A primal-dual algorithm usually maintains a feasible dual solution and tries to 
compute a primal solution that is both feasible and satisfies the complementary 
slackness conditions.7 If such a solution is found, the algorithm terminates. Oth-
erwise the dual solution is updated towards optimality and the algorithm continues 
with the next iteration. The progress of a primal-dual algorithm applied to a linear 
program is illustrated by the Figure 2 (a). 
Unfortunately, primal-dual algorithms can not be directly applied to an integer 
program if the feasible region of its linear relaxation has fractional extreme 
points.8 In this case the optimal solution of the linear relaxation may be fractional. 
To illustrate the problem consider two different ways of applying the primal-dual 
                                                          
7  For an overview of the linear and integer programming see [NW88, PS98]. 
8  Several dual-based procedures for solving integer programs are known (see [dVV03, 
NW88, PS98]). 
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approach to an integer program. If we apply it to the linear relaxation of the origi-
nal problem we will end up with a fractional  solution.  Alternatively,  we  can  re- 
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Figure 2: Progress of a primal-dual algorithm 
strict all computed primal solutions to be integer. In this case, however, comple-
mentary-slackness conditions are never satisfied and the algorithm will never 
identify the optimal solution. Additional stopping rules can be introduced, but the 
optimality of the best found primal solution is not guaranteed. One possible sce-
nario is shown in the Figure 2 (b). 
Note that if the feasible region of the linear relaxation has only integer extreme 
points, the primal-dual algorithm will always find the optimal solution. The prob-
lem formulation is called ”strong” or ”exact” in this case, and it is called ”weak” 
otherwise. A ”weak” formulation of any combinatorial program can always be 
strengthened by adding additional inequalities (cutting planes) valid for all integer 
feasible solutions but cutting off some fractional feasible solutions of the relaxa-
tion. However, the facet structure of many relevant (usually NP-hard) integer 
problems is either unknown or too complex to be used in this way.  
3.2.2 Duality and Competitive Equilibrium Prices 
In this section we give a very short overview of the primal-dual framework for the 
combinatorial auction problem (for details see [Park01]).  
Consider the linear relaxation of the CAP formulation introduced in the sec-
tion 2.2, we also call it the level 1 formulation CAP1. The CAP1 can be shown to 
be weak. It can be strengthened by adding valid inequalities in a special way, 
which results in the level 2 formulation CAP2. The formulation CAP2 can be fur-
ther strengthened by adding another family of valid inequalities resulting in the 
level 3 formulation CAP3, which can be shown to be strong (see [Park01]). 
The manner in which the three levels of CAP are constructed results in the follow-
ing important properties of the respective dual problems. The CAP1 dual variables 
can be interpreted as anonymous linear prices, the CAP2 dual variables – as 
anonymous non-linear prices and the CAP3 dual variables – as discriminatory 
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non-linear prices. In all three cases it can be shown that the complementary slack-
ness conditions are satisfied exactly when the current allocation (primal solution) 
and the prices (dual solution) are in competitive equilibrium (see [Park01]).  
Now the proof idea of the Theorem 1 (section 3.1.2) can be sketched. If current 
prices are in competitive equilibrium with the provisional allocation, the comple-
mentary-slackness conditions are satisfied and the allocation is optimal. This 
proves the first part of the theorem. The second part is true since the CAP3 formu-
lation is strong and, therefore, a primal-dual pair of integer solutions which satisfy 
the complementary-slackness conditions exist. The direct interconnection between 
auctions, pricing schemes and the duality theory motivates applying the primal-
dual approach to the iterative auction design. 
3.2.3 Primal-Dual Auction Algorithms 
Several auction formats based on the primal-dual approach have been proposed in 
the literature. Though these auctions differ in several aspects, the general scheme 
can be outlined as follows: 
1. Choose minimal initial prices (usually set them to 0). 
2. Announce current prices and collect bids. Bids have to be higher or equal than 
the prices. 
3. Compute the current dual solution by interpreting the prices as dual variables. 
Try to find a feasible allocation (an integer primal solution) that satisfies the 
stopping rule. If such solution is found, stop and use it as the final allocation. 
Otherwise update prices appropriately and go back to 2. 
Concrete auction formats based on this scheme can be implemented in different 
ways. The most important design choices are the following: 
• pricing scheme  
• price update rule 
• way of computing a feasible primal solution in each iteration 
• stopping rule 
• type of information feedback (provisional allocation, prices, etc.) 
Though the effect of different pricing schemes is insufficiently studied by experi-
ments, some conclusions can be done on the basis of the previous section. In case 
of discriminatory non-linear prices CE prices do always exist and a properly de-
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signed auction can be shown to converge to the efficient solution.9 Since anony-
mous non-linear CE prices do not always exist, an auction utilizing this pricing 
scheme is generally expected to produce less efficient results. [Park01] derives a 
”bid safety” condition, which makes it possible to dynamically determine the ne-
cessity of the price discrimination and to introduce it only as it is required. Linear 
prices usually do not support the optimal allocation in case of super- or subaddi-
tive valuations, which should in theory lead to losses in the allocation efficiency. 
The price update rule is the key design feature, it differs considerably among the 
auction formats. In some auctions prices are increased on all overdemanded bun-
dles, in others they are only increased on the so called ”minimal overdemanded 
bundle sets”. Often a fixed price increment is used. We will give a comparative 
overview of the different proposed price update rules in the section 4. 
Though the primal-dual design does not require computing a feasible allocation in 
each iteration (in fact, the auction only needs to update prices appropriately), such 
allocation is usually found by maximizing the auctioneers revenue given the cur-
rent bids. This ”locally optimal” provisional allocation is communicated to the 
bidders and is declared the winning allocation when the auction terminates. 
Prices are usually increased in a way to maintain the CE-condition 2 (see defini-
tion 3) over the auction runtime. In this case the auction finds CE prices as soon as 
no overdemanded bundles exist (all bids that are valid at the current prices belong 
to the provisional allocation). This condition is often used as the stopping rule. 
Certainly, the primal-dual approach is not the only possibility to design an itera-
tive combinatorial auction, but it may be the most systematical one. In the next 
section we describe several proposed auction formats, some of which are based on 
the primal-dual scheme, the others are not. 
4 Selected Auction Formats 
Most of the ICA formats have been proposed during the past few years. As al-
ready indicated in the section 2.3, the complexity of the rules makes the game-
theoretic analysis much more difficult. Many researches are using simulations, 
laboratory experiments or field studies to investigate an auction behavior. Though 
some experimental results of this kind are available for individual auctions, very 
few comparative tests have been performed, and there is little knowledge about 
the preferability of specific auction formats in different settings. 
                                                          
9  This is shown in [Par01] and [dVSV03] for the correspondent auction respectively. 
The important assumptions are the myopic best-response bidding strategy and small 
enough bid increments. 
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Figure 3 illustrates a classification of ICA. First we differentiate between the com-
binatorial auctions (auctions that allow package bidding) and the pseudo-
combinatorial auctions. One well known example of a pseudo-combinatorial auc-
tion is the Simultaneous Multiple Round (SMR) design used by the FCC to auction 
spectrum licenses, which works by running multiple single-item auctions  simulta- 
pseudo-combinatorial auctions
(SMR)
Goal: design an iterative auction that utilizes
super-/subadditivity in bidder valuations
combinatorial auctions
(bidding on packages)
bidder-side allocation
(AUSM, PAUSE)
auctioneer-side allocation
(RAD, iBundle, clock auction, etc.)  
Figure 3: Iterative auction hierarchy 
neously. Though the bidders are able to utilize some synergies of the simultaneous 
bidding, the auction suffers from the exposure problem because of the single-item 
bidding. The key SMR properties are summarized in the Table 5. 
We further classify the combinatorial auctions into auctioneer-side allocation auc-
tions and bidder-side allocation auctions. The bidder-side allocation auctions have 
been developed for small problems where bidders can cooperate in order to find a 
better allocation by themselves in each iteration. Two well known members of this 
family are the Adaptive User Selection Mechanism (AUSM) ([Ban+89]) and the 
Progressive Adaptive User Selection Environment (PAUSE) ([KeSt00]). Though 
these auctions solve the exposure problem by package bidding, they are still vul-
nerable to the threshold problem, require full information revelation and introduce 
high complexity at the bidder's side. Due to their structure these auctions do not 
use pricing and therefore are not the subject of this paper. 
In the auctioneer-side allocation auctions the auctioneer solves the winner deter-
mination problem after the bids are collected. She then provides some kind of in-
formation feedback to support the bidders in improving their bids in the next itera-
tion. Usually the bidder’s current winning bids and the item prices are communi-
cated. In the following subsections we give an overview of some promising auc-
tion formats belonging to this family. 
4.1 Primal-Dual Auctions with Discriminatory Pricing 
The iBundle Extend and Adjust ([Park01], [PaUn02]), Ausubel_2002 ([AuMi02]) 
and deVries_2003 ([Vri+03]) auctions are based on the primal-dual approach and 
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utilize the discriminatory non-linear pricing scheme.10 Though the primal-dual 
analysis is not explicit in Ausubel_2002, the auction format clearly follows the 
scheme described in the section 3.2.3. The key design features are summarized in 
the Table 6. 
 SMR Clock (CC)  RAD 
Bid structure items, OR  bundle, OR  bundle, OR 
Pricing scheme  anonymous linear  anonymous linear  anonymous linear 
Price used as  minimal bid price  bid price  minimal bid price 
 (increment excluded) 
Price updates  increase on all over-
dem. items 
increase on all 
overdem. items 
compute by solving 
several linear pro-
grams, can decrease 
Bid validity  current iteration + 
previously winning 
whole auction  current iteration + 
previously winning 
Feedback  prices, own winning 
bids 
prices  prices, own winning 
bids 
Stopping rule  no overdemand  no overdemand and 
no last iteration bid 
is displaced 
eligibility rules 
Table 5: Iterative combinatorial auctions overview 
All three auctions terminate with competitive equilibrium prices (and therefore an 
efficient allocation), if the bidders follow the myopic best-response bidding strat-
egy and the bid increments are small enough. They can also generate some kind of 
VCG or minimal CE prices in special cases.11 The main disadvantage of these auc-
tions is their cognitive and computational complexity, which is primarily caused 
by the discriminatory non-linear pricing. 
4.2 Combinatorial Clock Auction (CC) 
The Combinatorial Clock (CC) auction proposed in [Por+03] can also be seen as 
some kind of a primal-dual auction algorithm. It utilizes anonymous linear prices 
which are called item clock prices. In each round bidders submit which packages 
they would purchase at the current prices. If overdemand holds for at least one 
item the price clock ”ticks” for all overdemanded items (the item prices are in-
creased by a fixed price increment), and the auction goes to the next iteration. If 
there is no excess demand and no excess supply, the items are allocated corre-
                                                          
10  In [Par01] three different modifications of iBundle are proposed: the first with 
discriminatory prices, the second with anonymous prices and the third introduces the 
price discrimination dynamically as it is required. 
11  For the definitions of the various types of prices generated by the auctions see the 
corresponding papers. 
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sponding to the last iteration bids and the auction terminates. If there is no excess 
demand but there is excess supply (all active bidders on some item did not resub-
mit their bids in the last iteration), the auction solves the WD problem considering 
all bids submitted during the whole auction. If the computed allocation does not 
displace any active last iteration bids the auction terminates with this allocation, 
otherwise the prices of the respective items are increased and the auction contin-
ues. The key design features of the CC auction are summarized in the Table 5. 
 iBundle  Ausubel_2002 deVries_2003 
Bid structure  bundle , XOR  bundle, XOR  bundle, XOR 
Pricing scheme  discr. non-linear 
(discr. can be intro-
duced dynamically) 
discr. non-linear discr. non-linear 
Price used as  minimal bid price or 
bid price 
minimal bid price  bid price 
Price updates  increase on all over-
dem. bundles 
increase on all  
overdem. bundles 
increase on mini-
mal overdem. set 
Bid validity  current iteration + 
previously winning 
whole auction  not specified 
Feedback  prices, own winning 
bids 
prices, full history of 
winning/loosing bids 
prices 
Stopping rule  no overdemand or no 
new bids 
no overdemand or no 
new bids 
no overdemand or 
no new bids 
Table 6: Iterative combinatorial auctions overview 
The advantages of the CC auction are its cognitive, computational and communi-
cative simplicity. However this can result in efficiency losses. One kind of ineffi-
ciency can be due to the exposure problem, since OR-bidding is used. Another 
kind of inefficiency can be visualized by the following example. We have 3 bid-
ders and 3 items with the valuations v1(ABC) = 5, v2(AB) = 2, v3(C) = 2. The effi-
cient allocation is to sell the package (ABC) to the bidder 1 for the total revenue of 
5. The progress of the CC auction is illustrated by table 7. 
The Clock auction would allocate the package (AB) to the bidder 2 and the pack-
age (C) to the bidder 3 for the total revenue of 4, which is not efficient. This hap-
pens because the price of the package (ABC) increases from 3 to 6 in the second 
iteration, so that the bidder 1 has no chance to reveal its real valuation of 5. 
The authors do not provide any theoretical analysis of the auction efficiency, they 
only claim that the auction is ”simply a greedy algorithm to discover pseudo-dual 
upper-bound prices: The lowest prices at which everyone who submitted a bid is 
definitively declared a winner”12. The authors also report very good experimental 
efficiency results. 
                                                          
12  The definition of the pseudo-dual upper-bound prices is here due to [RSB82]. 
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Prices Active bids, prices  
Item A Item B Item C Bidder 1 Bidder 2 Bidder 3 
Iteration 1  1 1 1 (ABC, 3) (AB, 2) (C, 1) 
Iteration 2 2 2 2 — — (C, 2) 
End allocation  — — — — (AB, 2) (C, 2) 
Table 7: Clock auction example 
4.3 Resource Allocation Design (RAD) 
The Resource Allocation Design (RAD) auction proposed in [Kwa+03] also uses 
anonymous linear pricing. However instead of simply increasing the prices, the 
auction tries to compute a set of appropriate prices compatible with the current 
provisional allocation by solving a number of linear programs. Since anonymous 
linear compatible prices do not always exist, the auction has to use approximately 
compatible prices: prices at which some loosing bids are still higher than the price, 
but the number and the deviation of such bids is minimized. Bidders have to bid 
more then the prices plus a fixed bid increment. The stopping rule relies on eligi-
bility constraints which are defined similar to the eligibility constraints of the 
SMR auction. The key design features of the RAD auction are summarized in the 
Table 5. 
On the one hand, the efficiency of the RAD auction should be diminished by the 
anonymous linear pricing and the OR-bidding (exposure problem). However the 
auction gains additional flexibility, since the prices are computed dynamically. For 
example, the prices can be computed in a way that reduces the threshold problem. 
The authors provide extensive computational results proving promising efficiency 
results and particularly a significant gain in efficiency compared to the SMR auc-
tion. 
5 Conclusions 
The paper addresses the problem of defining market clearing prices in combinato-
rial auctions. As we have seen in section 4, there have been approaches to imple-
ment linear, non-linear anonymous, and even non-linear discriminatory prices. All 
these approaches have pros and cons. For example, allocative efficiency of non-
linear personalized prices can be traded off against bidders’ perceived fairness of 
the prices and computational complexity. But even if non-linear prices are per-
ceived as fair, the cognitive burden for bidders is still very high. New types of in-
formation feedback is needed to help bidders understand how much they need to 
improve their bids in order to win. It might also be possible to construct decision 
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support tools that help bidders construct optimal bundle bids in various application 
domains, given information about their production schedules and workload. Ex-
tensive experimental research and field studies are needed to address these cogni-
tive issues and develop robust combinatorial auction formats. 
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